





















## 8. REFERENCES

- [1] I. Abraham, M. Babaioff, S. Dughmi, and T. Roughgarden. Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements. In *Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC '12*, pages 3–16, 2012.
- [2] M. Armstrong. Competition in two-sided markets. *RAND Journal of Economics*, 37(3):668–691, 2006.
- [3] E. M. Azevedo and J. D. Leshno. A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets. Available at SSRN 2260567, 2014.
- [4] M. Bagnoli and T. Bergstrom. Log-concave probability and its applications. *Economic Theory*, 26(2):445–469, 2005.
- [5] S. Banerjee, S. Gollapudi, K. Kollias, and K. Munagala. Segmenting two-sided marketplaces. Available at SSRN 2920034, 2016.
- [6] O. Besbes and I. Lobel. Intertemporal price discrimination: Structure and computation of optimal policies. *Management Science*, 61(1):92–110, 2015.
- [7] S. Bose, D. W. H. Cai, S. H. Low, and A. Wierman. The role of a market maker in networked cournot competition. *CoRR*, abs/1403.7286, 2014.
- [8] D. Chakrabarty and G. Goel. On the approximability of budgeted allocations and improved lower bounds for submodular welfare maximization and GAP. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 39(6):2189–2211, 2010.
- [9] P. A. Diamond. Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium. *Journal of Political Economy*, 90(5):881–94, 1982.
- [10] U. Feige. On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 39(1):122–142, 2009.
- [11] U. Feige, M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, R. Izsak, B. Lucier, and V. Syrgkanis. A unifying hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI'15*, pages 872–878, 2015.
- [12] R. Gomes and A. Pavan. Price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets. Technical report, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 2011.
- [13] H. Halaburda, M. J. Piskorski, and P. Yildirim. Competing by restricting choice: the case of search platforms. *Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper*, 10-098, 2015.
- [14] J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, and É. Tardos. Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. *Mathematical Programming*, 46(1):259–271, 1990.
- [15] G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, and M. L. Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions. *Mathematical Programming*, 14(1):265–294, 1978.
- [16] J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 1(4):990–1029, 2003.
- [17] R. Rogerson, R. Shimer, and R. Wright. Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(4):959–988, 2005.
- [18] L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik. The assignment game I: The core. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 1(1):111–130, 1971.
- [19] J. Vondrak. Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model. In *Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC '08*, pages 67–74, 2008.
- [20] E. G. Weyl. A price theory of multi-sided platforms. *The American Economic Review*, pages 1642–1672, 2010.